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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES-STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONs-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
statute of limitations begins to run on claims for total disability
due to occupational diseases under the Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation Act when the claimant knew or should have known
that he or she suffered from total disability due to occupational
disease.
Price v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 626 A.2d 114
(Pa. 1993).
John Price ("Appellant") was employed for thirty-five years as a
maintenance employee at Metallurgical Resources ("Employer"), a
lead refining and smelting plant.1 Appellant routinely was exposed
to lead-laden dust and loud noise in the scope of his employment.2
Consequently, Appellant was unable to work for approximately one,
month as a result of a disability causally related to lead absorp-
tion.3 Accordingly, Appellant was appropriately paid workers' com-
pensation benefits for the one month period of alleged disability
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act
("Act").4 Appellant's lead poisoning disability terminated at the
end of the one month period.8
Subsequently, Appellant resigned from his job with the Em-
ployer.' Appellant, upon resignation, notified Employer's plant
physician that he was no longer capable of working as a result of
1. Price v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 626 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1993). The
smelting plant was located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Price, 626 A.2d at 115.
2. Id.
3. Id. Specifically, Appellant did not work from April 25, 1979 to May 29, 1979. Id.
4. Id. The Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1
to 1031 (1991), states, in pertinent: "Every Employer shall be liable for compensation for
personal injury to, or for the death of each employee, by an injury in the course of his
employment, and such compensation shall be paid in all cases by the employer, without
regard to negligence .. " 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 431 (199i).
In order to obtain workers' compensation benefits under the Act, an employee must either
enter into a compensation agreement with the employer or file a claim petition. 77 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 751 (1991).
In 1993, the title of "The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act" was changed to
"The Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act." 1993 Pa. Laws 44.
5. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. Specifically, Appellant's disability terminated on May 29,
1979, with the formal execution of a final receipt of workers' compensation benefits signed
by the Appellant on May 30, 1979. Id.
6. Id. at 115. Appellant resigned in August of 1979. Id.
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physical ailments emanating from adverse employment conditions
at the plant.7 Appellant specifically complained of overexposure to
lead.8 However, Appellant further informed Employer's plant phy-
sician that he could continue to work as long as he was not re-
quired to perform employment duties within the lead plant.9
Thereafter, Employer's plant physician instructed Appellant to ap-
ply for unemployment compensation benefits 0 while he searched
for a new source of future employment." Hence, Appellant re-
ceived two months of unemployment compensation because he was
allegedly capable of full time employment outside of lead exposure
and, as such, was neither partially nor totally disabled for work at
that particular period in time. 2
In March of 1983, Appellant was examined by a physician and
diagnosed as suffering from severe physical impairments and dis-
ease as a result of the lead exposure.13 Appellant's treating physi-
cian concluded that Appellant was totally disabled as a result of
his work-related ailments."4 Accordingly, Appellant filed a petition
for workers' compensation benefits under the occupational disease




10. Price, 626 A.2d at 115. Section 401 of the Unemployment Compensation Act, 43
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 751 to 914 (1991), sets forth the qualifications required to secure
compensation and provides in pertinent part as follows:
Compensation shall be payable to any employee who is or becomes unemployed, and
who: (c) has made a valid application for benefits with respect to the benefit year for
which compensation is claimed and has made a claim for compensation in the proper
manner and on the form prescribed by the department; (d)(1) is able to work and
available for suitable work....
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 801 (1991).
11. Price, 626 A.2d at 115.
12. Id. The Act was designed specifically to compensate employees incapable of per-
forming requisite employment duties as a result of injuries arising in the scope of employ-
ment; if an employee is capable of full time employment with the current employer then
workers' compensation benefits are not an appropriate remedy. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 411 (1991).
The fact that the Appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits provided
the basis for the inference that he considered himself employable, and that unemployment
authorities in granting benefits considered him able to accept suitable employment. See
Masouskie v. Hammond Coal Co., 94 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1953).
13. Price, 626 A.2d at 115. Specifically, Appellant suffered from lead encephalopathy,
peripheral neuropathy, noise-induced hearing loss, lead nephropathy, and severe chronic ob-
structive lung disease. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Section 411 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
The terms "injury" and "personal injury", as used in this act, shall be construed to
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cepted the expert medical testimony of Appellant's treating physi-
mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, arising in
the course of his employment and related thereto, and such disease or infection as
naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reactivated or accelerated by the
injury; and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under this act,
it shall mean only death resulting from such injury and its resultant effects, and oc-
curring within three hundred weeks after the injury....
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411 (1991).
All claim petitions and all papers requiring action by the Department of Labor and Indus-
try and its referees shall be sent to the Department at its principal office. 77 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 714 (1991). Following proper filing of the claim petition with the Department of
Labor and Industry, "the Department shall, in fulfillment of its responsibilities under [the]
Act, enforce the time standards and other performance standards herein provided for the
prompt processing of injury cases .. " 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 710 (1991).
Section 717.1 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
The employer and insurer shall promptly investigate each injury reported or known
to the employer and shall proceed promptly to commence the payment of compensa-
tion due either pursuant to an agreement upon the compensation payable or a notice
of compensation payable as provided in section 407, on forms prescribed by the de-
partment and furnished by the insurer.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 717.1 (1991).
However, if, after the injury, the potentially liable employer and the aggrieved employee
"fail to agree upon the facts thereof or the compensation due under this Act, the employee
or his defendants may present a claim petition for compensation to the [Department of
Labor and Industry]." 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 751 (1991). See also note 4 for the remedy
provided to injured employees under the Act.
16. The entire administration of the Act is regulated by the Department of Labor
and Industry which has extensive rule and regulation making powers. 77 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 710, 836, 991(a) (1991). Referees are appointed to conduct workers' compensation
hearings by and subject to the general supervision of the Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Industry. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 701 (1991). Referees are civil service employ-
ees and are not required to have law degrees. Id.
Section 751 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any claim for compensation is presented and the only issue involved is the
liability between the defendant or the carrier or two or more defendants or carriers,
the referee of the department to whom the claim in such case is presented shall forth-
with order payments to be immediately made by the defendants of the carriers in
said case. After the department's referee or the board on appeal, render a final deci-
sion, the payments made by the defendant or carrier not liable in the case shall be
awarded or assessed against the defendant or carrier liable in the case, as costs in the
proceedings, in favor of the defendant or carrier not liable in the case.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 751 (1991).
In further detail of the hearing procedure for workers' compensation claims, section 771
provides:
A referee of the department may, at any time, review and modify or set aside a notice
of compensation payable and an original or supplemental agreement or upon petition
filed by either party with the department, or in the course of the proceedings under
any petition pending before such referee, if it be proved that such notice of compen-
sation payable or agreement was in any material respect incorrect.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 771 (1991).
Under the Act, the referee must make, in writing, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
award or disallowance of compensations as the petition before him and the provisions of the
Act require. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 833 (1991).
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cian; however, the referee concluded that Appellant suffered from
the alleged symptoms of occupational disease four years earlier. 17
The referee further concluded that since Appellant was aware that
his subsequent physical ailments were causally related to his work
activities at the time of his resignation, his workers' compensation
claim petition filed nearly four years after his resignation was ef-
fectively barred by the three-year statute of limitations require-
ment set forth in the Act."8
The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board ("Board") 19 and the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 0 affirmed the referee's de-
cision denying benefits to Appellant on the grounds that his claim
was barred by the three-year statute of limitations."1 Appellant pe-
titioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a writ of alloca-
tur.22 The Supreme Court granted allocatur to address two specific
issues raised by Appellant: (1) when the statute of limitations be-
gins to run on a claim for total disability under the occupational
disease provisions of the Act, and (2) when a claimant is charged
with knowledge that he or she suffered total disability as the result
of an occupational disease. 3
17. Price, 626 A.2d at 115.
18. Id. at 116. Section 315 of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act provides
in pertinent part as follows: "In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be
forever barred, unless, within three years after the injury. . . . The term 'injury' in this
section means, in case of occupational disease, disability resulting from occupational dis-
ease." 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1991).
19. Each decision of a referee is subject to appeal to the Workers' Compensation
Appeal Board. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 853 (1991). An appeal must be taken within 20
days after notice of a referee's award or disallowance of compensation has been served upon
a party. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 853 (1991). The standard hearing conducted before the
Workers' Compensation Appeal Board is an appellate hearing whereby briefs are appropri-
ately filed and oral arguments are presented; hence, it is not an evidentiary hearing. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763(a)(1) (1981).
20. Any party may appeal any action of the Board regarding a matter of law to the
commonwealth court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 763(a)(1), 5105(a)(2) (1981).
21. Price, 626 A.2d at 115.
22. Allocatur is the term used to denote that a writ or order is allowed. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
23. Price, 626 A.2d at 115. On appeal to the supreme court, Appellant acknowledged
that he knew upon resignation that he was partially disabled as a result of lead absorption,
but that he was not totally disabled from his work-related ailments. Id. at 116. Appellant
claimed that he only became aware of his total disability through the medical examination
by his treating physician. Id. Appellant further asserted that his claim petition for workers'
compensation benefits fell within the three-year statutory period because the petition was
timely filed within 30 days of the treating physician's diagnosis of total disability. Id. Fur-
ther, Appellant argued that without a competent medical diagnosis, a claimant for occupa-
tional disease benefits under the Act should not be expected to realize he or she is totally
disabled as a result of the occupational disease. Id.
Recent Decisions
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decisions of
the Board and of the commonwealth court. 4 In so doing, the court
clearly established that the statute of limitations begins to run on
claims for total disability when the claimant knows or should know
that he or she suffers from total disability due to occupational dis-
ease.25 Consequently, the court maintained that the claimant's
knowledge of total disability would likely follow a medical diagno-
sis. 26 Further, the court emphasized that although a medical diag-
nosis is not the only means by which a claimant could acquire
knowledge of total disability due to occupational disease, a strong
and persuasive presumption existed that the discovery of an occu-
pational disease resulting in total disability initially resulted when
the claimant became aware of such condition through competent
medical diagnosis.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania focused considerable atten-
tion on the commonwealth court's failure to consistently rule ac-
cording to its own established precedent. Previously, the com-
monwealth court had asserted that the statute of limitations did
not begin to run on a claimant's claim petition for total disability
benefits under the occupational disease provisions of the Act until
the onset of total disability.29 Therefore, the supreme court dis-
agreed with the commonwealth court to the extent that its decision
conflicted with its own previously established law.30
Additionally, the supreme court deemed it necessary to evaluate
24. Id. at 116. Justice Papadakos wrote the opinion for the court. Id. at 115.
25. Id. at 117.
26. Id. The court relied on its previous decision in Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro, 125 A.2d
365 (Pa. 1956), for this proposition. Ciabattoni involved a claimant's appeal from the refe-
ree's decision dismissing a claim petition for compensation under the Pennsylvania Occupa-
tional Disease Act ("ODA"), 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1201 to 1603 (1991), on the ground
that it was not filed within the time limits prescribed by the ODA. Ciabattoni, 125 A.2d at
366. The Ciabattoni court held that the statute of limitations period commences when a
claimant knows by competent medical diagnosis that a disability was caused by an occupa-
tional disease. Id. at 367. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Ciabattoni.
27. Price, 626 A.2d at 117.
28. Id. at 116. The court was referring to the prior commonwealth court decision in
Findlay Refractories v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 415 A.2d 1270 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1980). The commonwealth court had noted in Findlay Refractories that if par-
tial disability triggered the three year period for filing a total disability claim, then an unde-
sirable outcome could result since the onset of partial disability could transpire more than
three years before disability became total. Findlay Refractories, 415 A.2d at 1274. See notes
72-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Findlay Refractories.
29. Price, 626 A.2d at 116 (citing Findlay Refractories, 415 A.2d at 1274).
30. Id.
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the method for determining Appellant's awareness that his total
disability was work-related under the occupational disease provi-
sions of the Act.3' The court concluded that Appellant's claim for
occupational disease benefits under the Act commenced after the
medical diagnosis by his treating physician four years after his res-
ignation.32 Thus, although Appellant's symptoms existed prior to
his resignation, the court reasoned that it did not necessarily fol-
low that Appellant was totally disabled from his cumulative
exposure.3
Moreover, the court focused on the fact that Appellant was still
employable, although in a restricted capacity, on the day in which
he last worked for his employer. 4 Furthermore, Appellant was also
employable for the months following his voluntary resignation
when he qualified and received unemployment benefits.3 5 Further,
the court reasoned that Appellant's disabling condition was not
likely to be self-diagnosed as a total disability.36 Hence, the su-
preme court concluded that it was unreasonable to infer that Ap-
pellant could, or should, have known that he was suffering from a
31. Id. The court relied on the standard previously set forth in Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Feiertag), 496 A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1985), as well as part of the rationale enunciated in Ciabattoni. The commonwealth
court concluded in Feiertag that the three-year filing period under the Act would commence
when the claimant knew or should have known of the occupational disease disability. Feier-
tag, 496 A.2d at 415. See notes 78-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Feiertag.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned in Ciabattoni that because an occupational
disease is often difficult to determine, the three-year statute of limitation could not com-
mence until a competent medical evaluation had made claimant aware of the disability.
Ciabattoni, 125 A.2d at 367.
32. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. The court did not distinguish total disability under the
ODA, 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (1991), and that arising under the occupational dis-
ease provision of the Act, 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 411, 27.1 (1991), because in both
instances a three-year statute of limitations applied. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. Section 1201 of
the ODA reads in part as follows:
[The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act] shall apply to disabilities and deaths
by occupational disease as defined in this act, resulting from employment within this
Commonwealth, irrespective of the place where the contract of hiring was made, re-
newed, or extended, and still not apply to any such disabilities and deaths resulting
from employment outside the Commonwealth.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (1991).
33. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. In support of this conclusion, the court specifically noted
that Appellant's lead poisoning disability had terminated as of May 29, 1979, when Appel-
lant signed the final receipt of workers' compensation benefits paid on May 30, 1979. Id.
34. Id. Specifically, the court commented that the claimant was employable on Au-
gust 31, 1979, the last day he worked for the Employer. Id.
35. Id. The supreme court adopted the reasoning set forth by Judge Barbieri in his
dissent of the commonwealth court's opinion. Price v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board, No. 1205 C.D. 1987, slip op. at 4-6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (Barbieri, J., dissenting).
36. Price, 626 A.2d at 117.
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total disabling occupational disease prior to the medical diagnosis
by his treating physician. 7 Therefore, the court asserted that Ap-
pellant was not required to file a claim petition until March of
1983, when he was first informed of the extent of his disability by a
competent medical physician.38 Because Appellant's claim petition
for workers' compensation benefits was timely filed within one
month of the diagnosis of total disability, it was in compliance with
the time requirements of the Act.39 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed and remanded the case to the
Workers' Compensation Appeal Board for the appropriate award
of workers' compensation benefits.40
The first Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act addressing
the issue of employment-related injuries and disabilities was origi-
nally enacted on June 2, 1915.4 1 The enactment of the Pennsylva-
nia Workmen's Compensation Act effectively eliminated the em-
ployee's common law tort cause of action against the employer for
alleged work-related injuries. 2 The Act represented a compromise
agreement between the employee and the employer; in exchange
for the employee surrendering the right to file a civil action against
the employer, the employer forfeited the right to raise the em-
ployee's potential contributory negligence or assumption of risk as
affirmative defenses. 43 The sacrifice of common law.affirmative de-
fenses exposed the employer to the potential of increased liabilities
and forced the legislature to institute strict time restrictions re-
quiring the injured employee to assert a claim of disability within a
specified period of time."
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id, The applicable section of the Act is 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1991). See
note 18 for the applicable statutory language.
40. Price, 626 A.2d at 118.
41. A. F. BARBIERI, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DiS-
EASE § 2.01 at 4 (1975). Section 1 of the Act on June 2, 1915, reads as follows: "This act
shall be called and cited as the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, and
shall apply to all accidents occurring within the Commonwealth, irrespective of the place
where the contract of hiring was made, renewed or extended." 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1
(1915) (current version at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 (1991)).
42. David B. Torrey, Time Limitations in the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and Occupational Disease Acts: Theoretical Doctrine and Current Applications,
24 DUQ. L. REV. 975, 978 (1986).
43. Torrey, cited at note 42, at 978. See also BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 507 at 227
(stating that an employee cannot sue an employer for alleged injuries caused by deliberate
derelictions of the employer).
44. Torrey, cited at note 42, at 979. Section 602 of the Act provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
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In 1937, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed the first occupa-
tional disease act.4 5 However, the original 1937 occupational dis-
ease law was repealed in 1939 when the legislature enacted an en-
tirely separate statutory system for occupational diseases.46 The
Occupational Disease Act ("ODA") was designed to create an ex-
clusive remedy for employees suffering from occupational disease
arising in the course of employment.' 7 Occupational diseases had
In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless,
within three years after the injury the parties shall have agreed upon the compensa-
tion payable under this article; or unless within three years after the injury, one of
the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in article four hereof.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1991).
45. Act of July 2, 1937, Pub. L. 552, 2714 (repealed 1939). The inaction of the Penn-
sylvania Legislature from 1915 to 1937 was attributable in part to the significant influence
from major industries, especially those with known occupational hazards, which kept con-
stant pressure upon state congressmen to avoid any changes to the status quo. BARBIERI,
cited at note 41, § 7.01 at 9. Currently in the United States, all 50 states now provide gen-
eral compensation coverage for occupational diseases. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DEATH, § 41 at 7-480 (1993). Historically, occupa-
tional disease coverage always "lagged" behind general workers' compensation coverage for
work-related accidents in the United States. LARSON, § 41.20 at 7-487.
46. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 2.01 at 4. The Occupational Disease Act reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
This act shall be called and may be cited as the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease
Act. It shall apply to disabilities and deaths caused by occupational disease as defined
in this act, resulting from employment within this Commonwealth, irrespective of the
place where the contract of hiring was made, renewed, or extended, and shall not
apply to any such disabilities and deaths resulting from employment outside the
Commonwealth.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (1991).
A large number of the coal mining companies in Pennsylvania strongly opposed the first
Occupational Disease Act passed in 1937. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 7.01 at 9. In response
to the influential opposition, the 1939 legislature created a separate occupational disease
statute as a complete compensation system. Id. In order to avoid the burden of occupational
disease liability upon the hazardous coal mining industry, special advantages were created
in the law which limited liability on certain lung disease, including "silicosis, anthro-silico-
sis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, or asbestos." Id. Specifically, section 1401 of the ODA
reads as follows:
Compensation for silicosis, or anthro-silicosis, coal worker's pneunoconiosis and as-
bestos, shall be paid only when it is shown that the employee has had an aggregate
employment of at least two years in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, during a
period of ten years next preceding the date of disability, in an occupation having
silica, coal, or asbestos hazard.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1401(d) (1991).
Through the enactment of "unusually restrictive defenses", the Pennsylvania legislature
exhibited a strong desire to protect Pennsylvania industries from substantial occupational
disease liability. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 7.01 at 11.
47. 1939 Pa. Laws 566, No. 284 (codified at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (1991)).
The original title of the Occupational Disease Act stated that it was: "[An] act defining the
liability of an employer to pay damages for occupational disease contracted by an employer
arising out of and in the course of employment; establishing an elective schedule of compen-
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not previously qualified for workers' compensation in Pennsylvania
and could only be compensated by traditional tort actions at com-
mon law."" The ODA provided benefits for specifically enumerated
occupational diseases, primarily diseases of the lungs."' Both the
Act and the ODA were given a liberal interpretation by the courts
in favor of the employee.8 0
No significant or substantial amendments were made to the Act
following the 1937 and 1939 amendments until the legislature in-
stituted the most sweeping changes by passing the 1972 amend-
ments ("1972 amendments"). 1 The 1972 amendments were insti-
tuted "to correct procedural deficiencies and assure the full
payment of compensation when due. '52 Accordingly, the ODA of
sation; providing procedure for the determination of liability and compensation thereun-
der." 1939 Pa. Laws 566, No. 284 (codified at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (1991)).
48. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 2.04 at 6.
49. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1208 (1991). Section 1208 of the ODA provides in part
as follows:
The term "occupational disease," as used in this act, shall mean only the following
diseases:
(k) Silicosis, anthraco-silicosis or coal-worker's pneumoconiosis (the latter two com-
monly known as Miner's Asthma and hereinafter referred to as anthraco-silicosis or
coal worker's pneumoconiosis) in any occupation involving direct contact with, han-
dling of, or exposure to the dust of anthracite or bituminous coal and or dust of
silicon dioxide....
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1208(k) (1991).
See also Kline v. Arden H. Verner Co., 469 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1983). The court in Kline con-
cluded that the ODA did not automatically bar litigation involving alleged claims not cov-
ered by the ODA. Kline, 469 A.2d at 159. Furthermore, the legislature gradually liberalized
the areas of coverage under the ODA to include additional new disease coverage after 1939.
BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 7.05 at 35.
50. Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 42 A.2d 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945). The court in
Roschak concluded that the Occupational Disease Act was to be liberally construed in favor
of the employee. Roschak, 42 A.2d at 284. See notes 58-65 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Roschak.
The court's liberal interpretation of the ODA was especially significant in the adjudication
of issues pertaining to the date when the statute of limitations began to run in cases of
disability resulting from an occupational disease. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 7.05 at 35.
51. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 2.02 at 5.
52. BAmwIau, cited at note 41, § 2.03 at 6. The preamble statement of the Act of
February 8, 1972 explains part of the motivation for the changes. Id. The preamble
provides:
Statutory limits on the amount of compensation payable for wage loss resulting from
work-connected disabilities are so low that they prevent the majority of injury victims
from receiving reasonable indemnity for their injuries and defeat the declared pur-
pose of the law, namely to compensate injury victims to the extent of two thirds of
their wage loss.
1972 Pa. Laws 159, No. 61 (codified at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 (1972) (current version
at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 (1991)).
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1939 was not repealed in any manner by the 1972 amendments."3
The 1972 amendments also dramatically changed the definition of
accident by substituting the word "injury" for "accident" as the
basis of the cause of action. 4 The 1972 amendments further con-
solidated the provisions of the ODA into the Act." The Act ex-
panded the term "injury" to include the scheduled occupational
diseases previously covered under the separate occupational dis-
ease system enacted in 1939.11 The 1972 amendments also required
that recovery for work "injury" must have been based upon either
the suffering of an actual trauma or upon an enumerated occupa-
tional disease.
53. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 7.01(2) at 12. However, section 1000 of the Workers'
Compensation Act provided that:
No person who is qualified for or is receiving compensation under this [A]ct shall,
with respect to the same period, receive compensation under the Pennsylvania Occu-
pational Disease Act [77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (1991)]: Provided, however,
that any person may pursue, in the alternative, a claim for compensation under this
act and a claim for compensation under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1000 (1991).
The maximum weekly compensation rate payable in occupational disease cases for total
disability benefits under the 1939 Occupational Disease Act in the year 1973 was $60.00 per
week, whereas the 1972 amendments substituted a compensation rate equal to two-thirds of
the state-wide average weekly wage as the maximum; the average weekly wage was fixed at
$150.00 in 1973. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 7.04(1) at 29.
54. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 3.04 at 8. See note 15 for the statutory definition of
the term "injury." Under the 1972 amendments, section 411 of the Act seemingly provided
that if there exists sufficient work causation, the employer's injury is compensable under the
Act "regardless" of his previous physical condition. See also Lawrence B. Abrams, Com-
ment, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis Of Persistent Problems And
Recent Legislative Reform, 76 DICK. L. REV. 445, 465 (1972). The 1972 amendments com-
pelled the courts to base compensability on causation with regard to the claimant's
symptomology. Id.
55. Section 411(2) of the Act provides that: "The terms 'injury', 'personal injury', and
'injury arising in the course of his employment', as used in this act, shall include, unless the
context clearly requires otherwise, occupational disease as defined in section 108 of this
act." 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411(2) (1991).
Section 108 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
The term "occupational disease," as used in this act, shall mean only the following
diseases:
(a) Poisoning by arsenic, lead, mercury, manganese, or beryllium, their preparations
or compounds, in any occupation involving direct contact with, handling thereof, or
exposure thereto ....
(q) Coal worker's pneumoconiosis, anthraco-silicosis and silicosis (also known as
miner's asthma or black lung) in any occupation involving direct contact with, han-
dling of or exposure to the dust of anthracite or bituminous coal.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 27.1(a) and (q) (1991).
56. BARBIERI, cited at note 41, § 3.06 at 12.
57. Id. at 13. In Dunn v. Merck and Co., Inc., 345 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1975), the supreme
court noted that the ODA was designed to be a vehicle for compensation in situations where
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In Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works,5 a the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania addressed for the first time the issue of whether notice of
occupational disease disability was given within the proper time
requirement. 9 The workers' compensation referee had found that
the claimant's disability and death were predominantly caused by
an occupational disease. 0 However, in finding for the defendant,
the referee disallowed compensation on the ground that notice of
disability had not been given the employer within the time limit
prescribed by the Act." In so holding, the superior court was re-
quired to determine the point of time at which the disability began
for purposes of the ODA. 62 The court emphasized that an occupa-
tional disease was insidious and the time of the resultant disability
was often difficult to ascertain.83 Consequently, the superior court
opined that the claimant had no knowledge of his true, disabling
condition until he was properly diagnosed by a competent physi-
the disease, though not enumerated specifically in the Act, was still generated by a compen-
sable occupational hazard. Dunn, 345 A.2d at 603.
Furthermore, the 1972 amendments increased the statute of limitation period from six-
teen months to two years. Act of February 8, 1972, 25 Pub. L. No. 12, § 2 (1972)(codified as
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1972)). However, in 1974, the legislature changed the limita-
tion period from two years to three years. Act of December 5, 1974, 782 Pub. L. No. 263,
§ 13 (1974) (codified as 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1991)).
58. 42 A.2d 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).
59. Roschak, 42 A.2d at 281. The court stated that the Pennsylvania appellate courts
had not previously addressed this specific issue. Id.
60. Id. at 280. The claimant was employed in defendant's foundry for approximately
five years during which he was routinely exposed to dusty conditions from constant sand
blasting. Id. The claimant notified the defendant/employer that he would be absent from
work for an indefinite period of time as a result of an undiagnosed illness. Id. Claimant was
absent from work for approximately seven months when he was diagnosed by a competent
medical physician as suffering from advanced anthraco-silicosis. Id. at 281. Claimant filed a
claim petition shortly thereafter under the applicable section of the ODA. Id.
61. Id. at 280. Specifically, section 311 of the ODA provided:
Unless the employee or someone in his behalf, or some of the dependents or someone
in their behalf, shall give notice of disability to the employer liable for compensation
under this article, within fourteen (14) days after the disability begins, no compensa-
tion shall be due until such notice be given,and unless such notice be given within
ninety days after the beginning of disability no compensation shall be allowed.
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1411 (1939) (current version at 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1411
(1991)).
The court decided that the time from when the period of ninety days was computed
under the Act was the date of the "accident" and "injury"; whereas, under the ODA, the
time was from the date the "disability begins" and "the beginning of the disability". Ros-
chak, 42 A.2d at 282. The court opined that the time which starts the running of the statute
of limitations was not easily fixed under the ODA. Id.
62. Id. at 281.
63. Id. at 282.
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cian. s" Hence, the court liberally interpreted the time of tolling of
the statute of limitations for purposes of the ODA. 6
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-examined
the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run on claims
filed under the ODA. In Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry
and Machine Co.," the injured employee was found to be totally
disabled from an occupational disease but was denied workers'
compensation benefits by the referee because the appropriate
claim petition was not timely filed.6 7 On appeal, the court adopted
the rationale introduced in Roschak.ss The court reasoned in
Ciabattoni that the statute of limitations ran from the date when
the compensable disability, due to the occupational disease, began
and that date was necessarily a variable one depending upon when
the pertinent medical diagnosis was competently established to the
knowledge of the claimant. 9 In finding for the claimant, the court
further noted that an accident was distinguishable from an occupa-
tional disease in that an accident arose from a definite event, the
time and place of which could invariably be determined; however,
an occupational disease developed gradually over a long period of
time.70
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue
of whether the three-year statute of limitations requirement could
be triggered by partial disability.7' In Findlay Refractories v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,7 2 the employer acknowl-
edged that the claimant was totally disabled, but sought to avoid
potential liability on the contention that the employee's claim peti-
tion was not timely fileds.7  The employer argued that the three-
64. Id. Upon learning of his condition, the claimant in Roschak immediately filed his
claim petition alleging total disability as a result of anthraco-silicosis in accord with the
stringent time requirements of the Act. Id.
65. Id. at 284.
66. 125 A.2d 365 (Pa. 1956).
67. Ciabattoni, 125 A.2d at 366.
68. Id. at 368. The referee in Ciabattoni found that the claimant was totally disabled
as a result of silicosis on December 22, 1952, but failed to file the appropriate claim petition
until January 4, 1954. Id. at 367. Section 602 of the ODA required that all claims for com-
pensation be filed within one year after the disability began. Id. (citing 77 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 602). The claimant contended that the statute of limitations did not commence until
the claimant knew or should have known that his disability was due to silicosis. Id.
69. Ciabattoni, 125 A.2d at 367.
70. Id. at 368.
71. See note 55 for the statutory definition of an injury regarding recognition of po-
tential compensability under the ODA.
72. 415 A.2d 1270 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
73. Findlay Refractories, 415 A.2d at 1274. Claimant had been employed for 14 years
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year period for filing a claim petition for total disability was trig-
gered by claimant's prior partial disability.7 ' However, the court
responded that the onset of partial disability could easily have oc-
curred more than three years before disability became total.75
Therefore, if the claim-filing period commenced prior to the onset
of total disability, the statutory right to file the claim could likely
have expired before it accrued .7  The court ruled accordingly, that
the statute of limitations requirement was triggered only by the
onset of total disability.7
The court applied the same rationale with respect to the statute
of limitations and occupational disease in Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corporation v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Feiertag).78 In Feiertag, the employer appealed an order of the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirming the referee's
award of benefits to claimant for disability resulting from occupa-
tional disease under the Act.79 The court found that the claimant
was disabled as of February 1976, when he was hospitalized.80
However, the claimant was unaware of his disability and its work-
related cause until he received his treating physician's medical re-
port approximately five years later.8 1 The employer -argued that
as a laborer for the defendant's refractories industry. Id. at 1271. As a result of adverse
employment conditions, claimant experienced breathing difficulties throughout his last year
of work. Id. Approximately four months after his last day of employment with the defend-
ant, claimant filed a claim petition under the ODA claiming total disability due to silicosis.
Id. The defendant employer argued that a tentative medical diagnosis of June 17, 1974,
sufficiently informed the claimant of his disability; therefore, the claimant's amendment of
the claim petition in November 1977, to proceed under the Act, was more than three years
after the "injury" or knowledge of such injury. Id. at 1272.




78. 496 A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). Senior Judge Barbieri wrote the opinion for
the commonwealth court. Id. at 414.
79. Feiertag, 496 A.2d at 414. Claimant was employed with defendant from 1945 to
January 17, 1974, whereby he was routinely exposed to arc-welder fumes, acid fumes and
smoke. Id. Claimant was diagnosed in February 1976 as being totally disabled due to a
work-related lung disease. Id. However, the examining physician failed to inform the claim-
ant of his expert opinion. Id. Claimant was later examined by a second physician and diag-
nosed as suffering from work-related pneumoconiosis. Id. The second physician's report was
forwarded to claimant's attorney who failed to divulge the information to claimant. Id. at
414. Upon learning of the contents of the medical report, claimant secured new legal counsel
and proceeded to file a claim petition on January 13, 1981. Id. at 415. The referee awarded
claimant compensation for a disability resulting from occupational disease. Id.
80. Id. at 416.
81. Id. The claimant received his treating physician's report on December 23, 1980.
Id. at 416.
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the claim petitions2 was filed outside of the three-year limitation
period of the Act 3 and the claimant's request for compensation
was therefore barred. 4 The court's rationale distinguished the two
limitation periods enumerated in the Act.8 5 The court noted that
the starting point for the limitation period under the occupational
disease provision of the Act was the date of a claimant's last em-
ployment wherein he or she was exposed to the hazard causing the
occupational disease.8 6 The court determined that the starting
point for the limitation period for non-occupational diseases under
the Act was the occurrence of the disability itself.87 Therefore, the
commonwealth court concluded that the three-year period in
which a claimant must file a claim petition under the Act com-
menced at the time when a claimant knew, or should have known
through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and knew that
it was causally related to an occupational disease. 8 Accordingly,
82. Id. The claimant filed the appropriate claim petition on January 13, 1981, ap-
proximately three weeks after he became aware of his disabling condition through an expert
medical opinion. Id.
83. Id. Specifically, the employer was referring to section 315 of the Act. Id. See note
18 for the applicable statutory language regarding the statute of limitations restriction.
84. Feiertag, 496 A.2d at 417. The court referred to the long-established principle
that the compensation laws are remedial legislation and are to be broadly construed to effec-
tuate their remedial and humanitarian purposes. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 417. Specifically, the court distinguished section 301(c)(2) of the Act, codi-
fied at 77 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 411(2) (1991), and section 315 of the Act, codified at 77
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1991). Section 301(c)(2) of the Act reads, in part, as follows:
The terms "injury," "personal injury," and "injury arising in the course of his em-
ployment," as used in this act, shall include, unless the context clearly requires other-
wise, occupational disease as defined in section 108 [77 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 27.1
(1991)] of this act: Provided, that whenever occupational disease is the basis for com-
pensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or
death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the
last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he [or she] was ex-
posed to hazards of such disease....
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411(2) (1991).
Section 315 of the Act reads, in part, as follows:
In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless,
within three years after the injury, the parties have agreed upon the compensation
payable under this article; or unless within three years after the injury, one of the
parties shall have filed a petition as provided in article four hereof.-Where, however,
payments of compensation have been made in any case, said limitations shall not
take effect until the expiration of three years from the time of the making of the most
recent payment prior to date of filing such petition. ..
77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602 (1991).
86. Feiertag, 496 A.2d at 417. The court was referring to section 301(c) of the Act. Id.
See note 85 for the text of section 301(c) of the Act.
87. Id. The court based this conclusion on section 315 of the Act. Id.
88. Id. at 419. The court relied on its prior decision in Findlay Refractories for this
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the commonwealth court reasoned that the legislature could not
possibly have intended to bar claims when the presence of an occu-
pational disease could not be discerned by the aggrieved
claimant. 89
The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Price9"
was wholly consistent with the court's tendency to liberally con-
strue the Act." Indeed historically the court has consistently con-
strued the Act liberally;92 however, the decision in Price represents
an extreme extension of the court's avowed liberal philosophy.
Specifically, the court concluded that Appellant was completely
unaware that he was totally disabled from thirty-five years of rou-
tine lead exposure when he resigned from employment with his
Employer. 3 However, upon resignation Appellant specifically told
Employer's plant physician that he was no longer capable of work-
ing inside the lead refining plant because of physical ailments
caused by his working conditions.9 " Appellant's admission to Em-
ployer's plant physician regarding his health status seemingly con-
tradicts the court's conclusion that Appellant's condition was not
susceptible to self-diagnosis.9
If upon resignation, Appellant was incapable of performing his
regular job duties due to physical ailments caused by routine expo-
proposition. Id. (citing Findlay Refractories, 415 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)).
89. Feiertag, 496 A.2d at 419. See also Torrey, cited at note 42, at 1041. Furthermore,
according to the general rule, a cause of action does not accrue until all its elements are
present. Id. Therefore, it is not fair for a statute of limitations to begin to run when the
potential claimant is not fully aware of his specific ailment. Id. Both Ciabattoni and Feier-
tag represent that notion. Id.
90. See note 23 and accompanying text.
91. See Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 439 A.2d 627 (Pa. 1981), in which the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remarked that the Act was remedial in nature and intended
to benefit the injured worker; thus, the Act was to be liberally construed to effectuate its
humanitarian purpose. Krawchuk, 439 A.2d at 630. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania adopted the reasoning of the supreme court in the drafting of its opinions. Feiertag,
496 A.2d at 419. See note 85 for an explanation of the court's reasoning in Feiertag.
Furthermore, the court's continual liberalization of occupational disease provisions was
most noticeable in connection with statute of limitations on notice and claim petitions. AR-
THUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (desk edition), § 41.10 at 7-80 (1983).
92. As early as 1946, the supreme court declared that the Act was to be liberally
construed in favor of injured employees. Kransky v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 47 A.2d 645, 647
(Pa. 1946).
93. Price, 626 A.2d at 117.
94. Id. at 115.
95. The court in Price concluded that it was unreasonable to infer that Appellant
should have known of his disabling condition prior to the medical diagnosis of his treating




sure to lead, a fact which Appellant undeniably acknowledged
when he spoke to the plant physician, then according to estab-
lished precedent96 Appellant was totally disabled until it could be
demonstrated that alternative employment existed within his ca-
pabilities.9 7 Furthermore, approximately three months prior to Ap-
pellant's resignation, Appellant received compensation benefits for
a disability causally related to lead absorption.98 Hence, Appel-
lant's receipt of compensation benefits for a disability causally re-
lated to lead absorption further reinforces the argument that Ap-
pellant could have been aware of a disabling condition at the time
of his resignation; after all, he was in fact disabled from lead ab-
sorption for over thirty days during the last four months of his
employment.99
The court reasoned that because Appellant signed a final receipt
of compensation payable,100 Appellant's prior disability was effec-
tively terminated.101 Hence, the court assumed that if Appellant's
disability had not terminated, then a final receipt would never had
been executed. 10 However, the court found that Appellant's symp-
96. See Pellegrino v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 289 A.2d 531 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1972), (holding that the employer must prove that work which the claimant is capable of
performing was in fact available to the claimant; absent such proof the claimant must be
compensated for total disability).
97. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 422 A.2d 228
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). If the injured employee can perform only limited job duties fitted to
his specific physical condition, then the employer must prove that alternative work was
available which the employee was capable of performing. Republic Steel Corp., 422 A.2d at
230. If alternative employment was not available, the employer must compensate the in-
jured employee for total disability. Republic Steel Corp., 422 A.2d at 230. Under the provi-
sions of the Act, compensation for total disability equals a certain specified percentage of
the wages of the disabled employee for the duration of the disability, but not to exceed a
specified maximum per week nor less than a specified minimum. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1406 (1991). After total disability ceases, liability for further payment of compensation
also ceases. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511 (1991).
98. Price, 626 A.2d at 115. Undoubtedly, Appellant had suffered from disabling lead
exposure prior to his resignation. Id. See note 3 for the exact dates of Appellant's pre-resig-
nation disability.
99. Price, 626 A.2d at 115.
100. Under the Act, a final receipt is an acknowledgement of all payments due under a
workers' compensation agreement. McGahen v. General Elec. Co., 177 A.2d 85 (Pa. 1962).
Furthermore, a final receipt is a method to terminate a compensation agreement. McGahen,
177 A.2d at 90.
101. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. Specifically, the court agreed with the referee's finding
that Appellant's lead poisoning disability had terminated as of May 29, 1979, as certified by
the signing of a final receipt on May 30, 1979. Id. However, the execution of a final receipt
does not preclude an employee from subsequently seeking additional compensation. Kissel
v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 41 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945).
102. Price, 626 A.2d at 117.
Vol. 32:649664
1994 Recent Decisions 665
toms were in fact present prior to his resignation. 10 3 Although the
court found that Appellant was aware of his symptoms prior to his
resignation, the court concluded that Appellant was not necessarily
aware of his disability from cumulative lead exposure.' It is diffi-
cult to reconcile the court's ultimate conclusion with the finding
that Appellant's symptoms were present prior to his resignation.
Furthermore, it seems unreasonable to conclude that Appellant as-
sumed his disabling lung condition effectively ceased to exist and
resolved itself with the execution of a final receipt of compensation
payable approximately three months prior to his resignation.
The issue presented in Price was seemingly resolved in 1986 by
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Feiertag.10 5 Interest-
ingly, the court in Price concluded that a medical diagnosis was
not the only way an injured claimant for occupational disease ben-
efits could become aware of the disability. 06 The court's decision
seemed to suggest that a strong presumption existed that discovery
of the occupational disability occurred when the medical diagnosis
was made known to the injured claimant. 0 7 The reason for not
tolling the statute of limitations until the injured employee had
knowledge of the work-related injury rested upon an accurate char-
acterization of the problems associated with occupational diseases.
An occupational disease is both latent and insidious and the re-
sultant disability is often very difficult to determine.10 8 Unlike a
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Price court relied in part on the commonwealth court's analysis in Feiertag,
496 A.2d 412. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. The court in Feiertag held that the discovery rule
applied to all occupational disease claims under the Act. Feiertag, 496 A.2d at 418. The
discovery rule refers to when the injured employee was considered to have knowledge of his
disabling condition. Id. See also notes 31 and 79 for further detailed explanation of the
court's rationale in Feiertag.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had previously only applied the discovery rule to
claims brought under the ODA and not claims under the occupational disease provision of
the Act. Ciabattoni, 125 A.2d at 367. The discovery rule required that the time fixed for
filing a claim petition for occupational disease causing disability would not begin to run
until the "pertinent medical diagnosis is competently established to the knowledge of the
claimant." Id.
106. Price, 626 A.2d at 117.
107. Id. Furthermore, the court concluded that the distinction between total disability
arising under the ODA and that arising under the occupational disease provision of the Act
was no longer necessary because in both instances a three year statute of limitations applies.
Id. See note 32 for the specific sections setting forth the total disability definitions under
the Act and the ODA.
108. Id. The court in Price adopted the characterization of occupational diseases first
set forth by the supreme court in Ciabattoni. Id. See note 31 for the supreme court's charac-
terization of an occupational disease in Ciabattoni.
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broken arm or a twisted ankle incurred during the scope of em-
ployment, which constitute compensable injuries under the Act,
occupational diseases are not as obvious to the aggrieved employee.
Thus, the court readily justified a liberalization of the statute of
limitation provisions for occupational disease because of the very
nature of the injury. 0 e The three-year limitation is only to run
from when the claimant knew of the work-related cause of his in-
jury and that he was totally disabled from the occupational dis-
ease.110 Nonetheless, the court in Price failed to adequately explain
the fact that Appellant was unaware of his disabling lung condition
for four years following resignation when the disabling symptoms
were in fact present at the time of his resignation from employ-
ment with his Employer.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Price does not
represent a pronounced intention of the court to relax the strict
standards traditionally associated with statute of limitation re-
quirements. Rather, the court was compelled to adopt a liberal in-
terpretation of the limitation requirements to effectuate the hu-
manitarian purpose of the Act. Throughout the history of the Act,
Pennsylvania courts have attempted to construe its provisions in
favor of the injured employee."' In ruling that the statute of limi-
tations did not begin to run until the injured claimant became
aware of the full and total extent of his disability through compe-
tent medical diagnosis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
once again affirmed the remedial nature of the Act. In so doing, the
court may have effectively adopted a rule whereby occupational
diseases will never be susceptible to self-diagnosis.
Brian Dixon Walters
109. Id. at 116. The court in Price adopted the analysis employed by the common-
wealth court in Findlay Refractories, acknowledging the predicament of having the statute
of limitations period triggered by partial disability. Id. See notes 72-77 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Findlay Refractories.
110. Price, 626 A.2d at 117. The supreme court distinguished partial disability from
total disability. Id. The court concluded that since the Appellant was still employable when
he resigned and received unemployment benefits, he was not "totally disabled". Id. How-
ever, under the Republic Steel Corp. analysis, the appellant would have been entitled to
total disability benefits under section 1406 of the Act. 77 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1406
(1991). See note 97 for a detailed explanation of the Republic Steel Corp. analysis.
111. Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 439 A.2d 215,
217 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). The commonwealth court explained that the Pennsylvania Leg-
islature clearly intended the Act to be remedial in nature and to be liberally construed, with
"borderline interpretations" resolved in favor of the injured employees. Builders Exchange,
Inc., 439 A.2d at 217.
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